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ABSTRACT 
 
  
Prior studies show that there is a negative association between IOS (Investment 
opportunity set) or growth opportunities and dividend payout. While there are several 
theories such as the signalling hypothesis, the tax hypothesis, free cash flow (FCF) 
hypothesis and the contracting hypothesis that maybe used to explain this relationship, 
the main theory suggested in the extant literature was Free Cash Flow Theory (FCF) by 
Smith and Watts (1992). According to the free cash flow theory, managers of firms 
with more growth opportunities or higher IOS (prospective investment opportunities 
and associated payoff distributions) are more likely to pay lesser dividends since these 
firms need the cash for growth opportunities. However, firms with low growth 
opportunities pay out more dividends since these firms have few opportunities to invest 
in positive net present value projects. 
 
 In this study I re-examine whether this negative relationship exists in the Malaysian 
corporate sector. I examine Malaysian firms because it is a developing country and also 
because of the existence of a global decline in the propensity to pay dividends 
especially among firms incorporated in common law jurisdictions. Further I investigate 
whether corporate governance variables such as (1) government ownership (2) board-
size, (3) board composition and (4) family ownership affects the association between 
growth opportunities and dividend policies. I examine government ownership because 
there seemed to be a high concentration of government link companies among public 
listed companies. Board-size and board composition is examined to evaluate to what 
extent those corporate governance monitoring have an impact on dividend payouts.  
 
No known prior study has investigated whether these variables moderate the 
relationship between growth opportunities and dividend payout. Several hypotheses are 
developed to test these relationships. Using data from annual reports of Malaysian 
companies I expect to find that there is a negative association between growth 
opportunities and dividend payout in Malaysian firms thus confirming prior findings 
and FCF theory. Further I expect that the relationship should be weaker for government 
owned as there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting a positive association between 
ownership and dividends since firms with government ownership have relatively less 
difficulty raising funds to finance investments and can therefore afford to pay 
dividends. As for family owned businesses, the relationship would be weaker because 
of the high concentration of family ownership as family members are concerned about 
wealth transfer. The relationship for board-size and board composition is envisaged to 
be negatively related to growth opportunities. 
 
 
The study will contribute to the literature in two ways.  Firstly, there has been no 
known prior study that has evidence on the role of corporate governance mechanism 
such as government ownership, board-size, board composition and family ownership 
and the association between investment opportunities and dividend policies and 
secondly, to re-establish the fact as to whether the prior studies’ finding on the negative 
relationship which exist between investment opportunities and dividend payout also 
prevails in the Malaysian corporate sector. 
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